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INTRODUCTION 
The Drexel Law Review Symposium, ERISA at 40: What Were They 
Thinking?, held on October 25, 2013, celebrated the forty-year anni-
versary of ERISA’s passage in 1974.1 Describing the process as a 
“decade-long quest to safeguard the retirement savings of American 
workers,” the Symposium provided remarkable insight into the po-
litical and policy challenges faced by the framers of ERISA.2 By pos-
ing the question, “What were they thinking?” to some of the key 
participants in ERISA’s enactment, the organizers of the Symposium 
sought to create an oral history that captured noteworthy events, 
concerns, and developments leading to the passage of ERISA that 
otherwise may not have been recorded.3 
ERISA established comprehensive changes in the regulation of 
private pension plans. These changes were designed to remedy 
identified defects in the retirement system believed to limit its over-
all effectiveness.4 With only 50% of the private, nonagricultural 
workforce covered by pension plans at the time, a purported objec-
tive of the ERISA legislation was to “promote a renewed expansion 
of private retirement plans and increase the number of participants 
receiving private retirement benefits.”5 
ERISA’s framers, however, recognized that the voluntary charac-
teristic of the private retirement system created a fundamental ten-
sion between having stricter coverage rules and the employers’ will-
ingness to offer retirement plans. Therefore, rather than mandating 
universal coverage, the drafters chose to address the coverage prob-
lem by setting limits that restricted the employers’ ability to exclude 
certain workers from their plans, should the employers choose to of-
fer them.6 The framers also chose to continue to rely on the use of 
tax incentives as a means of encouraging employers to voluntarily 
increase coverage in private retirement plans.7  
 
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012). 
2. Symposium, ERISA at 40: What Were They Thinking?, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 257 (2014). 
3. See id. 
4. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 1–2 (1973) (discussing the goals of pension reform legisla-
tion, including increasing the number of participants in the private retirement system). 
5. Id. at 2; see also S. REP. NO. 93-383, at 19 (1973) (“One of the major objectives of the new 
legislation is to extend coverage under pension plans more widely.”). 
6. See infra Part I (discussing nondiscrimination). 
7. See JOHN HEINZ ET AL., S. SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, THE EMP. RET. INCOME SEC. ACT OF 
1974: THE FIRST DECADE, S. PRT. NO. 98-221, at 30 (1984). 
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Since the passage of ERISA, coverage rates in the private retire-
ment system have not changed significantly; however, the retire-
ment savings culture has changed drastically. The predominant plan 
type has shifted from the defined benefit plan to the defined contri-
bution plan, resulting in a reallocation between the employer and 
the employee of the burdens and risks associated with retirement 
savings.8 
In defined benefit plans, the employer, rather than the participant, 
bears the risk of investment loss; this is because plan assets are 
pooled in an aggregate trust, and the participants are guaranteed 
pre-determined retirement benefits that are generally based on years 
of service and compensation.9 The employer is required to fund the 
plan sufficiently to pay the promised benefits—and is liable for 
payment—despite the investment performance of the plan assets.10 
In contrast, in defined contribution plans there is no single trust; 
instead, employers make annual contributions to accounts assigned 
to individual participants. At retirement, participants receive the 
balance in their accounts. Thus, the success or failure of these sav-
ings programs depends on how much has been contributed and 
how well the assets have been managed. Because the plan does not 
guarantee a specific amount to be paid at retirement, the employee 
alone bears the risk of investment loss.11 
The cash or deferred arrangement, better known as the 401(k) 
plan, represents the fastest growing type of defined contribution 
plan and dominates new plan offerings in the private sector.12 In 
401(k) plans, employees elect to have portions of their compensation 
contributed to a qualified retirement plan, rather than to receive 
them as compensation in the year in which they are earned. Partici-
pant-directed 401(k) plans additionally require participants to de-
cide the manner in which their accounts are to be invested, includ-
ing whether, and to what extent, portions of their compensation are 
 
8. See Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution Plans, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 
607, 613 (2000) [hereinafter Jefferson, Rethinking]. 
9. Id. at 610–11. 
10. See id.; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1310 (2012) (establishing the Pension Benefit Guaran-
tee Corporation, which provides limited insurance when an employer fails to meet its pension 
obligations). 
11. See Regina T. Jefferson, Redistribution in the Private Retirement System: Who Wins and 
Who Loses, 53 HOW. L.J. 283, 301 (2010) [hereinafter Jefferson, Redistribution]; see also Jefferson, 
Rethinking, supra note 8, at 612. 
12. See Jefferson, Redistribution, supra note 11, at 302 nn.85 & 87. 
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contributed to the plan.13 Having such choices requires 401(k) plan 
participants to assume even more of the risks associated with their 
retirement savings than other types of defined contribution plans. 
Therefore, the dominance of 401(k) plans as primary retirement sav-
ings vehicles significantly restructures the retirement savings envi-
ronment by presenting employees with decision making challenges 
that they previously did not face. This development has created the 
need to identify new and different ways of accomplishing ERISA’s 
goal of maximizing the number of workers who receive meaningful 
retirement benefits from the private retirement system in the current 
pension landscape.14 
This Reflection seeks to respond to this challenge by analyzing 
current coverage and participation rates in the private retirement 
system, and by proposing methods of achieving a broader and more 
equitable distribution of benefits received from 401(k) plans. Specifi-
cally, Part I of this Reflection describes and critiques the effective-
ness of the existing nondiscrimination standards for encouraging in-
creased coverage in the private retirement system. Part II examines 
current trends with respect to various segments of the working 
population and concludes that existing pension law and policies are 
providing inadequate retirement benefits to low- and middle-
income workers participating in 401(k) plans. Part III proposes the 
following three recommendations for increasing participation rates 
in the current pension climate: (1) mandatory education programs 
for all 401(k) plans; (2) mandatory automatic features in 401(k) 
plans; and (3) an additional tax incentive to encourage greater par-
ticipation of low- and middle-income employees, as measured by 
their vested accrued benefits. 
I. THE COVERAGE CONCEPT 
Expanding pension coverage for non-highly compensated work-
ers has long been a goal of federal pension policy.15 The House Ways 
and Means Committee Report accompanying the Revenue Act of 
 
13. See Regina Jefferson, Balancing Greater Protection with Individual Choice in 401(k) Plans, in 
BEYOND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN UNITED STATES TAX LAW 193, 199 (David A. Brennen et al. 
eds., 2013) [hereinafter Jefferson, Balancing]. 
14. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
15. See, e.g., General Tax Reform: Panel Discussions Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 
93d Cong. 1122–23 (1973) (statement of Prof. Daniel Halperin, Law School, University of 
Pennsylvania); see also Bruce Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good In-
tentions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REV. 419, 426–29 (1984) (discussing the history of 
the nondiscrimination concept in tax law). 
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1942 refers to the function of the nondiscrimination standards as 
preventing “the [pension] trust device from being used for the bene-
fit of shareholders, officials, or highly paid employees.”16 Also, in 
the Committee on Finance Report accompanying the Comprehen-
sive Private Pension Security Act of 1973, one of the listed goals of 
the legislation was to “increase the number of individuals partici-
pating in retirement plans.”17 More recently, the Pension Protection 
Act of 2006 sought to expand coverage and participation in 401(k) 
plans by encouraging automatic enrollment and escalation features.18 
Retirement plans that operationally meet the requirements of In-
ternal Revenue Code section 401(a) are said to be “qualified” plans.19 
The qualified status of a plan entitles employers as well as plan par-
ticipants to substantial tax benefits.20 The preferential tax treatment 
is justified as a method of encouraging employers to establish and 
maintain retirement plans that provide benefits not only to highly 
compensated employees, but also to low- and middle-income em-
ployees, who may find it difficult to save on their own.21 To ensure 
that plans operationally meet this objective and warrant the special 
tax treatment they receive, plans must satisfy a set of complex non-
discrimination rules designed to achieve broader coverage.22 
By relying on tax incentives, Congress effectively has chosen to 
pay a tax subsidy to high-income employees as a means of encour-
aging employers to establish and maintain plans that also cover 
lower-income employees.23 Accordingly, from a pension policy per-
spective, the tax subsidy for qualified plans is justifiable only if it re-
sults in greater retirement savings for low- and middle-income 
 
16. H.R. REP. NO. 77-2333, at 103–04 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372, 450. 
17. S. REP. NO. 93-383, at 1 (1973). 
18. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 902, 120 Stat. 780, 1033–40 
(2006); see also Jack VanDerhei, The Pension Protection Act and 401(k)s, WALL ST. J., http:// 
online.wsj.com/ad/employeebenefits-pension_protection_act.html (last visited May 29, 2014). 
19. I.R.C. § 401(a) (2012). 
20. See discussion infra Section III.C. 
21. Subcommittee Hearing on Pension Parity: Addressing the Inequities Between Retirement Plan 
Options for Small and Large Businesses: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin. and Tax of the H. 
Comm. on Small Bus., 110th Cong. 8–9 (2007) (statement of Jim McCarthy, Managing Director, 
Retirement Plan Services Morgan Stanley, on behalf of the Securities Industry & Financial 
Markets Association). 
22. See discussion infra Section I.B. 
23. See Jefferson, Redistribution, supra note 11, at 297–98. The tax subsidy for retirement sav-
ings was introduced in the 1920s. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 234(a)(1), 42 Stat. 227, 254 
(providing a deduction for business expenses such as “salaries or other [including deferral] 
compensation”); see also infra Section III.C. (discussing tax benefits of qualified plans). 
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workers.24 Furthermore, as a fiscal policy matter, the ideal subsidy 
level should be no greater than is required to cover the additional 
costs to the employer for covering low-income workers.25 
A. Defining “Coverage” and “Participation” 
To prevent abuse of the tax subsidy, the nondiscrimination rules 
establish limits on the employer’s ability to disproportionately shift 
contributions and benefits to highly compensated employees in 
qualified plans.26 Compliance with the rules requires that coverage 
and participation rates of highly and non-highly compensated em-
ployees be calculated and compared.27 Enforcement of the rules 
hinges on a quantifiable level of permitted disparity between the 
participation rates for these two classes.28 
Although the terms “coverage” and “participation” are essential 
to the nondiscrimination concept, they are not used consistently 
within the pension community.29 Common usage of the terms gen-
erally refers to whether a worker is benefitting from a plan in a giv-
en year; however, individuals and entities collecting the data on 
coverage and participation rates in the private retirement system of-
ten use criteria other than current accruals.30 As a result, coverage 
and participation rates in the private retirement system may be mis-
leading, particularly among certain groups.31 
 
24. See, e.g., Norman P. Stein & Patricia E. Dilley, Leverage, Linkage, and Leakage: Problems 
with the Private Pension System and How They Should Inform the Social Security Reform Debate, 58 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1369, 1389 (2001) (quoting Bruce Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified 
Retirement Plans: Good Intentions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REV. 419, 433 (1984)) (not-
ing that “[f]rom Congress’s perspective, the optimum level of tax subsidy is that which en-
courages the establishment of a retirement plan only if the social benefit of the plan equals or 
exceeds its costs”). 
25. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 410–11 (Robert C. 
Clarke ed., 5th ed. 2010). 
26. See, e.g., Russell K. Osgood, The Ages and Themes of Income Taxation: Savings and Invest-
ments, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 521, 527 (1983) (arguing that because “[n]ondiscrimination does not 
flow logically from the deduction provided for contributions . . . [t]he nondiscrimination prin-
ciple is based on a congressional determination that discrimination against lower paid people 
is unfair”). 
27. I.R.C. § 401(m) (2012). If 401(k) plans meet one of the design-based safe harbors, they 
are deemed to satisfy the “actual deferral percentage” tests, which are the special participation 
and nondiscrimination rules for 401(k) plans. See id. 
28. See id. 
29. See id.; see also John Turner et al., Defining Participation in Defined Contribution Pension 
Plans, 126 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 36, 36–37 (2003), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/ 
2003/08/art3full.pdf. 
30. See Turner et al., supra note 29, at 36–37. 
31. See id. at 37. 
JEFFERSON_GALLEYS (DO NOT DELETE) 9/4/2014  2:53 PM 
2014] INCREASING COVERAGE 469 
 
The concepts of “coverage” and “participation” are related but 
distinct. Coverage is used to broadly describe a worker’s association 
with an employer-sponsored pension plan.32 There are numerous 
reasons why a worker may not be associated with a plan sponsored 
by his or her employer.33 One reason is that the worker may not be 
the type of employee the plan is established to benefit.34 Employers 
are permitted to design their plans to exclude certain categories of 
employees so long as they satisfy the nondiscrimination rules.35 
Thus, for example, it is common practice for employers to differenti-
ate plan offerings based on factors such as whether an employee is 
salaried or paid hourly, or geographic location.36 
Another reason a worker may not be associated with a plan is be-
cause the worker is not “participating” in the plan.37 The term “par-
ticipation,” used in this context, refers to whether or not a worker is 
actually benefiting from a plan in a given year.38 Thus, workers can 
be covered by a plan while not participating in it. This situation 
generally occurs when a worker, although a member of the covered 
class of employees, has not satisfied applicable minimum age and 
service requirements imposed by the plan.39 
The term “participation,” however, has a different meaning de-
pending on whether it is used in reference to a defined benefit or a 
defined contribution plan.40 In defined benefit plans, where retire-
ment benefits are paid as a set amount, workers are considered par-
ticipants whenever they annually accrue portions of their retirement 
 
32. See id. 
33. See Craig Copeland, Emp. Benefit Research Inst., Retirement Plan Participation and 
Retirees’ Perception of Their Standard of Living, 289 ISSUE BRIEF 5 (2006), available at 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_01-20061.pdf (noting that some workers are 
not eligible to participate and others are unable to afford the employee contributions). 
34. Id. at 40 n.11. 
35. Susan J. Stabile, Is It Time to Admit the Failure of an Employer-Based Pension System?, 11 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 305, 322–23 (2007). 
36. See Daniel L. Halperin, Retirement Security and Tax Equity: An Evaluation of ERISA, 17 
B.C. INDUST. & COM. L. REV. 739, 742 (1976) (noting that some employers exclude workers in 
certain divisions or make distinctions based on whether the employee is hourly and salaried). 
Workers classified as independent contractors are also exempted from ERISA’s nondiscrimi-
nation calculations. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992) (ap-
plying common law agency principles to classify workers as employees or independent con-
tractors under ERISA). 
37. Turner et al., supra note 29, at 36–37. 
38. Id. at 36. 
39. See I.R.C. § 410(a)(1)(A) (2012) (allowing employers to exclude workers under the age 
of twenty-one or those with less than one year of service from the retirement plan). 
40. See Turner et al., supra note 29, at 36. 
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benefits under the plan.41 In contrast, in defined contribution plans, 
where the balances of the individual retirement accounts determine 
the benefits, workers generally are considered participants if they 
receive allocations of contributions or forfeitures to their accounts in 
a given year.42 In 401(k) plans, where employees voluntarily choose 
to participate, workers are considered participants if they are eligi-
ble to make elective contributions, whether or not they choose to do 
so.43 Consequently, an individual could be considered as actively 
participating in a 401(k) plan in a given year even if there were no 
contributions or forfeitures credited to his or her account during 
that year. 
The determination of whether an individual is participating in de-
fined contribution plans can be further complicated by whether a 
participant has an outstanding loan balance or not.44 When workers 
borrow from their plans, some defined contribution plans will not 
permit them to make contributions to the plan until the loan balance 
is paid off.45 As a result, in some cases individuals could be consid-
ered to be participating when they not only have no new accruals 
but also are not allowed to make new contributions to their retire-
ment plans.46 
The fact that the term “participation” is not consistently defined 
among those who compile data to be used for empirical studies re-
lating to participation rates in defined contribution plans suggests 
that the results may be misleading with respect to the rates of work-
ers actually receiving benefits from such plans. For example, in the 
Form 5500, which is used to report detailed statistical information 
about a plan to the Department of Labor, “active participation” for 
defined contribution plans is determined by whether a current 
worker has a positive account balance with the employer.47 This def-
inition allows workers who are not contributing to their retirement 
plans to be counted as “actively participating.”48 Accordingly, a 
 
41. See Barbara A. Butrica et al., The Disappearing Defined Benefit Pension and Its Potential Im-
pact on the Retirement Incomes of Baby Boomers, 69 SOC. SEC. BULL., no. 3, 2009 at 2, available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v69n3/v69n3p1.pdf. 
42. See Turner et al., supra note 29, at 36. 
43. Id. at 36–37. 
44. See Thomas Olson, 401(k) Leakage: Crafting a Solution Consistent with the Shift to  
Employee-Managed Retirement Accounts, 20 ELDER L.J. 449, 463 (2013). 
45. See id. 
46. See id.; see also Turner et al., supra note 29, at 36–37. 
47. See Turner et al., supra note 29, at 37. 
48. See Geoffrey Sanzenbacher, Estimating Pension Coverage Using Different Data Sets, 51 
CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RES. B.C. ISSUE BRIEF 1, 1 (2006), available at http://crr.bc.edu/ 
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worker who was once allocated a forfeiture, or who elected to make 
a single contribution in a prior plan year, would be considered to be 
actively participating for all subsequent years of service prior to 
separation or retirement. Such an expansive interpretation of the 
term appears to overstate participant rates and also is at odds with 
the underlying policy and purpose of the nondiscrimination rules.49 
Accurately calculating the percentage of workers covered by and 
participating in employer-provided private retirement plans is an 
important task. This information is necessary to quantify the cover-
age problem and to measure the outcomes of policymaking efforts 
to broaden benefit distribution. Currently, because workers are 
counted as participating in defined contribution plans when contri-
butions are being made neither by the employer nor the worker, the 
participation and coverage are unreliable measurements of the 
number of workers who are actively saving for retirement.50 
This result is problematic because it both obscures the issue and 
understates the coverage problem. One of the primary objectives of 
ERISA was to expand private retirement plans in order to increase 
the number of participants receiving retirement benefits. Therefore, 
the emphasis of initiatives to increase coverage in the private re-
tirement system should be on actual retirement savings as measured 
by the vested account balances rather than on amounts made avail-
able by the employer for retirement savings, or on the aggregate 
number of plans that are offered in the private retirement system.51 
Furthermore, as 401(k) plans are increasingly used as primary re-
tirement savings vehicles, the accurate measurement of meaningful 
participation in these plans will become more important in evaluat-
ing the effectiveness of the private retirement system, particularly as 
it relates to low- and middle-income workers.52 
B. The Nondiscrimination Rules 
The nondiscrimination rules are exceedingly technical and com-
plex.53 For the most part, the complexity is due to a mix of compet-
 
briefs/estimating-pension-coverage-using-different-data-sets/(noting that Form 5500 often 
overestimates the number of active participants in retirement plans). 
49. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
50. See Sanzenbacher, supra note 48. 
51. See discussion infra Section I.C.  
52. See Turner et al., supra note 29, at 42. 
53. See LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L. MOORE, LAW OF EMPLOYEE PENSION AND WEL-
FARE BENEFITS 437 (2d ed. 2008). 
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ing interests that creates tension in the structure of the rules. This 
tension exists because the private retirement system is voluntary, 
making it necessary to give tax benefits to highly compensated em-
ployees in qualified retirement plans so that non-highly compen-
sated employees can also benefit from such plans.54 Thus, on the one 
hand, the rules are designed to encourage broad participation and 
prevent excessive disparity in participation between non-highly and 
highly compensated employees. On the other hand, they are de-
signed to permit some level of disparity in favor of highly compen-
sated employees, who presumably could save on their own without 
tax incentives, so as not to discourage employers from establishing 
qualified retirement plans.55 
To ensure that qualified plans cover a significant percentage of 
the non-highly compensated workforce, the Internal Revenue Code 
has numerous nondiscrimination rules.56 One set of rules considers 
all of the employees of the employer to determine whether a suffi-
cient percentage of non-highly compensated employees are partici-
pating relative to the rate of participation of highly compensated 
employees.57 Another set of nondiscrimination rules considers per-
centages of participation based on the actual level of contributions 
or benefits provided by the plan to participants in order to deter-
mine whether the plan discriminates in favor of highly compensated 
employees.58 In addition to these rules that apply to all types of 
qualified plans, there are special nondiscrimination rules that apply 
 
54. See id. at 436–37. 
55. See S. REP. NO. 93-383, at 18–19 (1973) (warning that increasing coverage too expansive-
ly could lead employers to reduce benefits or stop offering new plans). 
56. See G.A. Mackenzie & Jonathan B. Forman, Reforming the Second Tier of the U.S. Pension 
System: Tabula Rasa or Step by Step?, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 631, 646 (2013). In addition to 
those described in this section of the article, there are the rules found in I.R.C. § 401(a)(26) that 
apply only to defined benefit plans. These rules provide: 
an objective test to determine whether the defined benefit plan actually covers 
enough employees. It is intended to address two concerns. First, it is designed to lim-
it the extent to which employers may create different benefit formulas for different 
groups of employees and thus maximize the benefits in favor of highly compensated 
employees. Second, it limits the extent to which a defined benefit plan can operate as 
an individual account for a single employee or a small group of employees. 
FROLIK & MOORE, supra note 53, at 436. Also, I.R.C. § 401(a) “permits certain plans to have a 
higher level of discrimination in contributions or benefits than would be permitted under 
I.R.C. § 401(a)(4)” when Social Security benefits are taken into account for purposes of the 
nondiscrimination tests. Id. at 437. 
57. See I.R.C. § 410(b) (2012). 
58. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(4). 
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to 401(k) plans.59 These rules recognize that contributions to 401(k) 
plans depend on an employee’s choice to defer compensation, and 
accordingly require that the deferral rates by highly compensated 
employees are proportional to those of non-highly compensated 
employees.60 
Employers, of course, can completely avoid the complexity of all 
of the nondiscrimination rules by providing uniform benefits to all 
employees covered by a plan.61 Many employers, however, do not 
choose the broadest coverage solution because they desire to reduce 
the costs of their plans.62 
C. Weaknesses of the Rules 
A significant weakness of the nondiscrimination rules is that they 
fail to distinguish between vested and non-vested accrued benefits.63 
Vesting is a concept that determines the rights of plan participants 
to receive the accrued benefits attributable to employer contribu-
tions in the event that employment is terminated prior to retire-
ment.64 The rationale for permitting forfeitures is that it gives em-
ployers a method of promoting worker retention by rewarding long-
term service.65 
The minimum vesting standards require that benefits become 
non-forfeitable after a prescribed period of years of service with an 
employer.66 The applicable vesting periods depend on the type of 
plan offered by the employer and the type of contribution.67 Benefits 
derived from an employee’s own contributions must be fully vested 
immediately, regardless of plan type.68 Benefits attributable to em-
 
59. See I.R.C. § 401(k)(3). See also I.R.C. § 401(k)(12) (outlining a “safe harbor” to ease the 
administrative burden on 401(k) plans that make a minimum employer contribution or meet 
specified matching requirements). 
60. See § 401(k)(3). There are, however, safe harbor rules for 401(k) plans that permit great-
er disparity between the levels of contributions made to and by highly and non-highly com-
pensated employees. 
61. See FROLIK & MOORE, supra note 53, at 437. See also I.R.C. § 410(b). 
62. See Kathryn L. Moore, An Overview of the U.S. Retirement Income Security System and the 
Principles and Values It Reflects, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 5, 46 (2011). 
63. See Sanzenbacher, supra note 48, at 1. 
64. See Halperin, supra note 36, at 743. 
65. See Daniel I. Halperin, Special Tax Treatment for Employer-Based Retirement Programs: Is It 
‘Still’ Viable as a Means of Increasing Retirement Income? Should It Continue?, 49 TAX L. REV. 1,  
8–9 (1993) (describing how workers who frequently change jobs will lose unvested benefits). 
66. See I.R.C. § 411(a)(2). 
67. See § 411(a)(2)(A)–(B). 
68. § 411(a)(1). 
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ployer contributions made to defined contribution plans must either 
vest fully after three years of service, or vest incrementally with a 
minimum percentage of 20% after two years of service and 100% af-
ter six years.69 Benefits attributable to employer contributions made 
to defined benefit plans must either vest fully after five years of ser-
vice, or vest incrementally with a minimum of 20% after three years 
of service and 100% after seven.70 
Vesting rates correlate strongly with earnings levels.71 As a gen-
eral rule, the lower the compensation, the higher the turnover.72 This 
relationship occurs because higher-paid employees tend to have 
more stable and lasting employment relationships with their em-
ployers than do lower-paid employees.73 According to a 2003 Em-
ployee Benefit Research Institute study, only 12% of workers with 
an annual income below $5000 were vested, as compared with 47% 
in the $20,000–$24,999 bracket, and 73% in the $50,000-and-over 
bracket.74 As a result, it can be predicted that lower-paid employees 
are more likely to forfeit portions of their accrued benefits than are 
higher-paid employees. 
Therefore, considering the goals of pension policy generally and 
the purpose of the nondiscrimination rules specifically, the use of 
vested accrued benefits, rather than accrued benefits alone, would 
appear to be a better indicator of the level of benefits received by 
plan participants from private retirement plans. Furthermore, be-
cause non-highly compensated employees are more likely to leave 
before becoming fully vested than highly compensated employees, 
the failure to use vested accrued benefits may disproportionately 
overstate the level of benefits actually received by non-highly com-
pensated workers. This result, coupled with the expansive definition 
of “participation” used in the measurement of participation rates, 
suggests that private retirement plans may provide even fewer re-
 
69. See § 411(a)(2)(B). 
70. See § 411(a)(2)(A). 
71. See EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, Table 10.9 (last updated 
May 2011), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/databook/DB.Chapter%2010.pdf 
[hereinafter EBRI DATABOOK]. 
72. See, e.g., Rachel Harvey, Note, Labor Law: Challenges to the Living Wage Movement: Obsta-
cles in a Path to Economic Justice, 14 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 229, 248 (2003) (“When employees 
receive higher wages they do a better job, as reflected in their improved morale, lower rate of 
absenteeism, lower turnover, and improvement in the quality of applicants.”). 
73. See id. 
74. See EBRI DATABOOK, supra note 71. 
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tirement benefits to low- and middle-income workers than the data 
indicates.75 
II. WHO IS COVERED AND WHO IS NOT 
Regardless of how broadly or narrowly the term is defined, par-
ticipation, like vesting, correlates very strongly with income.76 By 
any measurement, those who lack pension coverage tend to be low-
income employees and those who have it tend to be high-income.77 
Other factors that correlate with participation and coverage rates are 
worker demographics and employer characteristics.78 
A. Participation Rates and Income 
As of 2006, only 13% of individuals earning less than $5000 annu-
ally participated in a private retirement plan, as compared with 51% 
in the $20,000–$24,999 bracket, and 78% in the $50,000-and-over 
bracket.79 This result occurs partly because of the progressive tax 
rate structure of the federal income tax system, which makes exclu-
sions, deductions, and tax deferral more valuable to taxpayers with 
higher marginal tax rates.80 Consequently, high-income workers 
gain substantial economic benefits from the ability to accrue tax-free 
income in qualified retirement savings plans, whereas low-income 
workers do not.81 
The disparity in participation rates relative to income is of special 
concern in considering the effectiveness of 401(k) plans in light of 
 
75. See Sanzenbacher, supra note 48, at 1. 
76. See Craig Copeland, Emp. Benefit Research Inst., Employment-Based Retirement Plan Par-
ticipation: Geographic Differences and Trends, 392 ISSUE BRIEF 9-10 (2013), available at http://www 
.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_011-13.No392.Particip.pdf (noting that participation rate 
varies according to the employer’s size, industry, hours worked by the employee, age of the 
employee, and gender of the employee). 
77. Id. 
78. See id. 
79. See id. 
80. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EX-
PENDITURE ANALYSIS 52 (Comm. Print 2008) (“[T]ax expenditures formulated as deductions 
will generally reduce the progressivity of the tax system, by reducing average tax rates more 
for higher marginal rate taxpayers than for lower marginal rate taxpayers.”). 
81. Id.; see also Jefferson, Redistribution, supra note 11, at 294. But see Eric Toder & Karen E. 
Smith, Do Low-Income Workers Benefit from 401(k) Plans?, 11-15 CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RES. 
B.C. ISSUE BRIEF 1, 1 (2011), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/IB_11 
-15_508.pdf (noting that although low-income employees receive less of a direct benefit from 
the tax subsidy, the nondiscrimination rules provide an indirect benefit in the form of higher 
total compensation when employers make contributions to retirement plans). 
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their increasing popularity.82 These plans, which represent the fast-
est growing type of defined contribution plan, dominate new plan 
offerings in the private sector.83 As of 2009, approximately 67% of all 
employers maintaining retirement plans offered 401(k) plans as 
their primary retirement savings vehicles, as compared to 35% ten 
years earlier.84 
The distinctive characteristic of 401(k) plans is that employees 
voluntarily elect to make pre-tax contributions to the plan as de-
ferred compensation rather than receive those amounts as compen-
sation in the year in which they were earned.85 Notwithstanding the 
preferential tax treatment given to contributions made to qualified 
plans, low- and middle-income employees covered by elective con-
tribution plans often choose not to contribute.86 In fact, of all of the 
factors used to predict 401(k) plan participation, income level is the 
most important determinant of whether a worker will contribute or 
not.87 Thus, to encourage greater participation among low- and 
middle-income workers, many employers offering 401(k) plans will 
match the employees’ elected contribution at some level.88 For ex-
ample, the employer may match 100% of the first 1% of pay contrib-
uted by the employee, and 50% thereafter, up to a specified limit. 
Even with the prevalence of such incentives, however, less than 50% 
of all workers who earn $30,000 or less per year contribute to their 
401(k) plans, as compared to 87% of workers who earn $100,000 or 
more.89 
 
82. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 55. 
83. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR EMP.  BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., PRIVATE PENSION PLAN 
BULLETIN HISTORICAL TABLES 19 (2008), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/ 
privatepensionplanbulletinhistoricaltables.pdf (showing that the number of 401(k) plans in-
creased from 17,303 in 1984 to 436,207 by 2005). 
84. See Jefferson, Redistribution, supra note 11, at 301 & n. 79. 
85. See I.R.C. § 401(k)(2)(A) (2012). Employers are also permitted to match a certain 
amount of employee contributions, provided they comply with nondiscrimination rules. See 
I.R.C. § 401(m). 
86. See William F. Bassett et al., How Workers Use 401(k) Plans: The Participation, Contribu-
tion, and Withdrawal Decisions, 51 NAT’L TAX J. 263, 270 (1998). 
87. See id. 
88. See Jefferson, Redistribution, supra note 11, at 302–03. However, for 2014, the total 
amount contributed to an employee’s plan may not exceed the lesser of either the employee’s 
salary or $52,000. See Retirement Topics–401(k) and Profit Sharing Plan Contribution Limits, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Plan-Participant,-Employee/Retirement-Topics---401(k) 
-and-Profit-Sharing-Plan-Contribution-Limits (last updated Apr. 2, 2014). 
89. See VANGUARD, HOW AMERICA SAVES 2013: A REPORT ON VANGUARD 2012 DEFINED 
CONTRIBUTION PLAN DATA 23 (2013), https://institutional.vanguard.com/iam/pdf/HAS13.pdf. 
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Not surprisingly, contribution rates also vary with income.90 
When low- and middle-income workers do contribute, their contri-
butions represent a smaller percentage of income contributions of 
higher-income workers.91 In 1992, taxpayers with income below 
$30,000 made contributions of only 4% of their income, while tax-
payers with income over $75,000 made contributions of 8%.92 In 
2008, 54% of participating employees earning between $20,000 and 
$40,000 had savings rates so low that they annually saved less than 
$5000 in their 401(k) retirement plans.93 Such small amounts are 
grossly inadequate to provide retirement security for these work-
ers.94 Therefore, low- and middle-income workers using 401(k) plans 
as their primary retirement savings instruments are far less likely to 
accumulate adequate savings for retirement. 
There are numerous explanations for low participation rates 
among low- and middle-income workers. One reason, referenced 
above, is that low- and middle-income workers have lower marginal 
tax rates and, therefore, benefit less from the preferential tax treat-
ment of contributions to qualified retirement plans.95 Another rea-
son is that low- and middle-income workers have more immediate 
and pressing needs for their funds than saving for retirement.96 Al-
so, some low-income workers may be covered by means-tested wel-
fare programs that discourage participation by effectively imposing 
high implicit tax rates on all savings.97 Additionally, low participa-
tion rates may be the result of low-income workers undervaluing 
the benefits of retirement savings, or having reduced incentives to 
save for retirement because Social Security income-replacement 
rates are higher for low-income workers.98 
 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 28. 
92. Jefferson, Redistribution, supra note 11, at 303. 
93. See HEWITT, 2009 HEWITT BENCHMARKS - HOW WELL ARE EMPLOYEES SAVING AND INVESTING 
IN 401(K) PLANS 17 (2009), http://www.aon.com/attachments/thought-leadership/Hewitt 
_2009_Universe_Benchmarks.pdf. 
94. See Jefferson, Redistribution, supra note 11, at 303. 
95. See Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 329, 341 (2009) 
(noting that tax deductions are less valuable for low-income workers). 
96. See Bassett et al., supra note 86, at 270. 
97. Id. 
98. See AON CONSULTING, 2008 REPLACEMENT RATIO STUDY: A MEASUREMENT TOOL FOR RE-
TIREMENT PLANNING 2 (2008), http://www.aon.com/about-aon/intellectual-capital/attachments/ 
human-capital-consulting/RRStudy070308.pdf (finding that Social Security payments will re-
place about 60% of the pre-retirement income for a worker making less than $30,000 per year). 
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When low-income workers do choose to contribute to 401(k) 
plans, the occurrences of “cash outs” are more likely to erode their 
retirement savings. Plans typically allow participants to liquidate 
their account balances when they separate from service prior to 
reaching retirement age. Some plans automatically liquidate rela-
tively small account balances upon separation of service prior to re-
tirement.99 Cash outs occur when workers fail to roll over these dis-
tributions into other qualified retirement accounts. Although work-
ers can avoid paying taxes and substantial penalties when they roll 
over the funds into either an IRA or another qualified plan, a signifi-
cant number of workers choose not to do so. 
In 2010, approximately 42% of terminated employees chose to 
cash out their funds rather than roll them over.100 Within this popu-
lation, lower-income workers were more likely than higher-income 
workers to liquidate their retirement savings in this manner.101 Over 
one-third of employees earning less than $30,000 cashed out their 
account balances, as compared to only 10% of those who earned 
over $100,000.102 Obviously, when distributions from retirement sav-
ings plans are not reinvested in other retirement savings instru-
ments, it is far more likely that the funds will be used for non-
retirement purposes.103 
B. Other Worker Demographics Correlating to Participation Levels 
Factors other than income correlate with lower participation and 
coverage rates among low- and middle-income workers, including 
gender, age, and employer characteristics.104 In the aggregate, women 
have slightly lower levels of participation than do men.105 As of 
2012, 45% of all male workers between the ages of twenty-one and 
sixty-four participated in a private plan as compared to 44% of 
women in the same category.106 This result is attributable to numer-
ous factors: women earn lower wages; work fewer hours; have more 
 
99. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(v) (2012) (workers can avoid a 10% tax on early distribu-
tions from the plan if they are separated from employment after age 55); I.R.C. § 401(a)(31)(B) 
(permitting mandatory distribution when balances are under $5,000 total). 
100. See Olson, supra note 44, at 459. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Regina T. Jefferson, Striking a Balance in the Cash Balance Plan Debate, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 
513, 534 (2001). 
104. See Copeland, supra note 76, at 10. 
105. See id. 
106. Id. at 11. 
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episodic work patterns; and have greater concentration in industries 
in which retirement plan coverage is low.107 All of these factors cor-
relate with lower participation rates, regardless of gender.108 
Interestingly, however, when measuring participation rates 
among workers in individual employment status categories that 
have lower participation rates, such as part-time or seasonal work-
ers, women have higher participation rates than men.109 For exam-
ple, 22% of part-time, permanent female workers participate in 
plans, as compared to only 14% of men.110 
Age is another factor that influences plan participation rates. 
Across all income levels, younger workers are less likely than older 
workers to participate in a retirement plan.111 This disparity most 
likely reflects the fact that individuals are less willing to save for 
events that will occur decades in the future. Also, because ERISA 
exempts workers under the age of twenty-one from the nondiscrim-
ination tests, employers are not penalized for excluding very young 
workers from their plans.112 The combination of these factors reduc-
es the effectiveness of the tax incentives in maximizing participation 
among younger workers in private retirement plans. 
The size of a worker’s employer is another significant factor in 
predicting plan participation. Smaller companies are far less likely 
to sponsor retirement plans for their workers than are larger ones. 
Approximately 20% of individuals working for employers with fewer 
than twenty-five employees participate in employer-sponsored re-
tirement plans, whereas participation rates among employers with 
1000 or more employees exceed 60%.113 
Additionally, the type of industry in which the employee works 
correlates with plan participation. For instance, employees in the 
manufacturing, transportation, and financial industries are more 
likely to participate in employer-sponsored plans than employees in 
the service industry.114 Public sector workers are also more likely to 
participate in employer-sponsored plans than private sector work-
 
107. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 28. 
108. Id. 
109. See Copeland, supra note 76, at 10. 
110. Id. at 13, fig. 3. 
111. Id. at 14. 
112. See I.R.C. § 410(a)(1) (2012). 
113. See William E. Even & David A. Macpherson, Improving Pension Coverage at Small 
Firms, in OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP 123 (Diana Furchtgott-Roth ed., 2008) 
(reporting 2004 participation rates); see also Copeland, supra note 76, at 10 (reporting similar 
findings for 2012 rates). 
114. See Copeland, supra note 76, at 10. 
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ers.115 This correlation occurs presumably because employers in cer-
tain sectors of the economy are more likely to offer plans than em-
ployers in others. 
III. PROPOSALS TO INCREASE COVERAGE 
Although 401(k) plans dominate new private plan offerings, their 
popularity has not increased overall coverage in the private retire-
ment system. Coverage rates have hovered around 50% since the 
passage of ERISA, notwithstanding the shift from defined benefit to 
defined contribution plans.116 Therefore, there continues to be a need 
to explore ways of increasing coverage and participation rates, par-
ticularly among low- and middle-income workers, who in the ab-
sence of such incentives may be unable to save on their own. How-
ever, the methods used must be structured differently in the current 
pension landscape. 
Section 401(k) plans present difficult tradeoffs for plan partici-
pants. Participants are given greater autonomy and flexibility on the 
one hand, but on the other they are exposed to greater burdens and 
risks. At every stage of their retirement savings process, workers are 
required to make critical decisions regarding their retirement sav-
ings. These decisions can include whether to contribute, what level 
of contribution to make, and which investment strategy to use, as 
well as what to do with distributions received prior to retirement.117 
Regardless of the burdens and risks that these plans present to 
employees, they are more popular than traditional defined benefit 
plans because they are often less expensive, simpler, and less risky 
for employers to maintain.118 Thus, in spite of their shortcomings, 
the trend of using 401(k) plans as primary retirement savings in-
struments is well established and is unlikely to change in the near 
future. Without an option to offer a 401(k) plan, some employers 
may choose not to establish plans and, as a result, some employees 
may save even less for retirement.119 For these reasons, it would be 
difficult, even counterproductive, to eliminate 401(k) plans as re-
tirement savings options because of their tremendous appeal to em-
ployees and employers alike. 
 
115. See id. 
116. See Even & Macpherson, supra note 113, at 2. 
117. See Bassett et al., supra note 86, at 269. 
118. See Jefferson, Rethinking, supra note 8, at 636. 
119. Id. 
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Even so, the current benefit distribution in 401(k) plans does not 
effectively advance one of ERISA’s primary objectives—to broaden 
participation in private retirement plans.120 Furthermore, the current 
structure of the savings incentives in the private retirement system 
disproportionately benefits higher-income workers. Thus, to justify 
the tax subsidy given to qualified plans, affirmative measures must 
be taken to increase savings rates and broaden benefit distribution 
from 401(k) plans to include more low- and middle-income workers. 
In response to these concerns, the remainder of this Reflection 
proposes the following: (1) mandatory education programs for all 
401(k) plans; (2) mandatory automatic enrollment and escalation 
features in 401(k) plans; and (3) an additional tax incentive to en-
courage greater participation of low- and middle-income employees, 
as measured by their vested accrued benefits. 
A. Mandatory Employer-Provided Education in 401(k) Plans 
1. The benefits of financial education programs 
Notwithstanding the importance and complexity of the retirement 
planning decisions that employers sponsoring 401(k) plans require 
employees to make, there is currently no requirement that employ-
ers provide financial education or training. This situation is prob-
lematic because most individuals are not equipped to manage their 
own retirement security, lacking both financial training and prior 
experience with complex financial and investment matters.121 With-
out such training or experience, the majority of individuals eligible 
to participate in 401(k) plans make less-than-optimum decisions 
throughout the retirement savings process.122 
Research shows that financial illiteracy in the United States is 
widespread across the spectrum of workers.123 A survey conducted 
by the University of Michigan gave 1000 people between the ages of 
 
120. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
121. See Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress’ Misguided Decision to Leave 
401(k) Plan Participants to Their Own Devices, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 361, 392 (2002) (not-
ing that “participant decisions in 401(k) plans are often the product of deficient information, 
inadequate knowledge, and cognitive biases”). 
122. WAGNER LAW GRP., NAVIGATING THE NEW REALITIES OF 401(K) PARTICIPANT EDUCATION 2 (2001), 
http://www.wagnerlawgroup.com/documents/WPNavigatingtheNewRealitiesof401kParticipantEducation 
.pdf (advising that 401(k) “[p]lan sponsors also have a strong incentive to educate participants 
on investment concepts and provide allocation decision support, which can reduce the inci-
dence and severity of poor decision-making by participants”). 
123. See Olson, supra note 44, at 470–71 (noting that many Americans have limited 
knowledge of financial markets and prudent investing strategies). 
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eighteen and ninety-seven a financial literacy test.124 The study 
found that, on average, respondents could only answer 67% of the 
questions asked.125 These findings are disturbing because financial 
literacy is one of the best predictors of an individual’s ability to ef-
fectively make prudent financial decisions, including those necessary 
for effective retirement planning.126 
Similar results were reported from studies with smaller samples 
that target more specific aspects of financial literacy.127 For example, 
a study conducted in 1988 examined the level of knowledge workers 
had regarding their retirement plans.128 That study found that a sig-
nificant percentage of the subjects were unable to identify key fea-
tures of their plans, including the plan’s normal and early retire-
ment ages and how much their retirement benefits would increase if 
they postponed retirement.129 Other research has also determined 
that employees regularly misunderstand some of the key features of 
their plans.130 A 2007 study specifically targeting 401(k) plans found 
that nearly 50% of non-participating employees in 401(k) plans had 
low financial literacy and, of the employees who participated, more 
than 20% had low financial literacy.131 
Equally alarming, however, is the fact that a majority of employ-
ees not only fail to understand the features of their plans, but also 
substantially misestimate their expected benefits from both Social 
Security and their private retirement plans.132 This result is especially 
disturbing because Social Security and private retirement plans rep-
resent two of the three primary sources of retirement income, the 
third source being personal savings.133 Thus, having accurate infor-
 
124. See Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Financial Literacy: Evidence and Implica-
tions for Financial Education, May 2009, at 1, 2, available at https://www.tiaa-crefinstitute.org/ 
public/pdf/institute/research/trends_issues/ti_financialliteracy0509a.pdf. 
125. See id. 
126. See id. at 5–6. 
127. See id. at 2. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. See Olson, supra note 44, at 472. 
131. See id. (citing Julie R. Agnew et al., Do Financial Literacy and Mistrust Affect 401(k) Par-
ticipation? CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH ISSUE IN BRIEF, Nov. 2007, No. 7-17, at 1, 1–2, available at 
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2007/11/IB_7-17.pdf). 
132. Id.; cf. Colleen E. Medill, Transforming the Role of the Social Security Administration, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 323, 354 (2007) (proposing that the Social Security Administration should 
serve as the central authority providing education and advice on retirement savings and  
investment). 
133. See Stephen F. Befort, The Perfect Storm of Retirement Insecurity: Fixing the Three-Legged 
Stool of Social Security, Pensions, and Personal Savings, 91 MINN. L. REV. 938, 939 (2007) (noting 
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mation about the expected benefits from these two sources is criti-
cally important in financial preparation for retirement. 
Financial education programs are helpful in improving this situa-
tion by enabling workers to make better decisions and appreciate 
the risk of shortage if they fail to do so. A 2009 study conducted by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago found a positive correlation be-
tween employer-provided education programs and greater employ-
ee 401(k) contributions.134 The study further concluded that educat-
ing employees on the importance of planning for retirement raised 
overall retirement savings rates.135 Other studies supporting these 
findings show that individuals who attend financial education pro-
grams generally save more than individuals who do not.136 
2. A financial education requirement 
To ensure that 401(k) plan participants have access to financial 
education, an education requirement should be imposed on all em-
ployers sponsoring such plans. In the absence of a mandate, many 
plan participants will be forced to make important financial deci-
sions regarding their retirements without the benefit of financial ed-
ucation.137 Furthermore, requiring employers to assume some respon-
sibility for educating plan participants also helps to justify the tax 
 
that these three sources of retirement income are commonly referred to as the “three-legged 
stool”). The personal savings rate in America has fallen dramatically since the 1980s. Id. at 960. 
134. See Olson, supra note 44, at 474–75 (citing GENE AMROMIN ET AL., FINANCIAL LITERACY 
AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION AND COUNSELING: A REVIEW OF THE LITER-
ATURE 12–15 (2010), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/others/region/ 
foreclosure_resource_center/more_financial_literacy.pdf (last visited May 29, 2014)). 
135. Id.; see also William J. Arnone, Ernst & Young LLP, Educating Pension Plan Partici-
pants, Address at the 2004 Pension Research Council Symposium at the Wharton School in Phil-
adelphia, Pennsylvania (Apr. 26–27, 2004), available at http://pfeef.com/speeches/Educating 
-Pension-Plan-Participants.pdf. 
136. See, e.g., Robert L. Clark et al., Financial Education and Retirement Savings, Presenta-
tion at the Conference: Sustainable Community Development: What Works, What Doesn’t, 
and Why (Mar. 27–28, 2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/communityaffairs/ 
national/CA_Conf_SusCommDev/pdf/clarkrobert.pdf (noting the general consensus that fi-
nancial education programs increase employee savings rates). 
137. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) encouraged employers to offer education 
plans by amending ERISA to include an exemption from fiduciary liability for plans that pro-
vide investment advice to participants under eligible investment advice arrangements. See 
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780; Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1108(g) (2012); I.R.C. § 4975 (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408(g)-1 
(2013). Prior to the PPA, the fiduciary rules of ERISA deterred employers from providing fi-
nancial education programs because of the possibility that the programs could be considered 
investment advice, which under certain circumstances would be prohibited. See Jefferson, Bal-
ancing, supra note 13, at 206. 
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subsidy that employers receive in connection with their sponsored 
401(k) plans.138 
The success of an education program is determined both by its 
availability and its quality of instruction. Therefore, the proposed 
education requirement regulates the timing, the type, and the con-
tent of the information to be provided in the following manner: 
First, education programs satisfying the proposed mandate would 
be required to utilize a variety of educational media, including a 
complement of written materials, seminars, and financial planning 
software. This approach responds to evidence showing that printed 
information is less effective than other modes of communication in 
aiding the investment education of plan participants.139 
Second, the proposed education program would require that fi-
nancial education be made available on a regular basis to plan par-
ticipants throughout their employment, regardless of age.140 Re-
searchers have found that higher frequency of financial education 
programs is correlated with higher contribution levels among low-
income workers.141 Many employers presently offer one-time plan-
ning sessions to older employees, believing that only those ap-
proaching retirement need financial education. However, impru-
dent investment decisions can be just as devastating—if not more 
so—for younger employees. This is because younger employees 
have longer investment horizons; consequently, the negative impact 
of their mistakes are compounded over greater periods of time. In 
order to ensure that both older workers and younger workers have 
access to financial training, under the proposed education program, 
employers sponsoring 401(k) plans would be required to provide 
investment information periodically to all workers eligible to partic-
ipate in the plan.142 
The proposed financial education programs would also include 
instruction on the importance of not only contributions and invest-
ment allocation, but also the timing and forms of distribution. This 
information is essential in financial training because decisions re-
 
138. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
139. See Jefferson, Balancing, supra note 13, at 207 & n.103; see also WAGNER LAW GRP., supra 
note 122, at 11 (“Many participants will not respond to passive education or written materials 
. . . . Accordingly, plan sponsors should consider providing active education through a provider 
that engages participants and provides meaningful decision-making assistance to participants.”). 
140. See Olson, supra note 44, at 475, 480 (arguing for recurring, regular financial education 
plans). 
141. See id. at 475. 
142. See Jefferson, Balancing, supra note 13, at 207. 
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garding these matters have long-term effects on retirement security. 
For this reason, under the current law there are rules that encourage 
some forms of distribution over others, while other rules restrict ear-
ly access to retirement plan assets.143 These rules advance pension 
policy because the goal of the private retirement system is to assist 
workers in both saving for retirement and managing their assets to 
last throughout retirement. 
B. Mandating Automatic Enrollment and Escalation 
1. The concepts of automatic enrollment and escalation 
Initially, 401(k) plans were offered primarily as tax-preferred, 
supplemental accounts for employees who wished to save addition-
al amounts for retirement.144 Generally, employers who sponsored 
these plans also offered traditional defined benefit plans that pro-
vided non-elective predetermined retirement benefits.145 Therefore, 
because it was not anticipated that workers would rely on the 401(k) 
funds for their retirement security, it was appropriate to require 
employees to both take affirmative steps to enroll in the plan, and to 
assume all of the risks associated with it.146 However, as 401(k) plans 
are increasingly used as primary retirement savings instruments, a 
design that makes non-enrollment the default setting no longer 
seems appropriate.147 
Research shows that newly hired employees are very slow to elect 
to participate in 401(k) plans. After as many as three years of em-
ployment, nearly 33% of workers eligible to enroll have not elected 
to do so.148 Although it may appear that the choice to enroll is a sim-
ple one, there are a variety of savings and investment decisions in-
volved in the process that can easily explain the delay.149 To enroll, 
workers often must decide not only whether to contribute, but also 
 
143. See id. at 208 n.105; see also LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 511–35 (explaining that 
both ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code restrict the timing and character of distributions 
from qualified plans). 
144. See SHLOMO BENARTZI, SAVE MORE TOMORROW: PRACTICAL BEHAVIORAL FINANCE SO-
LUTIONS TO IMPROVE 401(K) PLANS 3–4 (2012); see also Kara M. Klaas, Left in the Dark: Sarbanes-
Oxley and Corporate Abuse of 401(k) Plan Blackout Periods, 29 J. CORP. L. 801, 804 (2004). 
145. See FLA. PUB. PENSION TRS. ASS’N, 401(K) PLANS ARE NOT RETIREMENT PLANS 6 (Mar. 
10, 2010), available at http://www.fppta.org/FPPTA/MR_Articles.aspx. 
146. See BENARTZI, supra note 144, at 4–5. 
147. See id. 
148. See id. at 5. 
149. See id. 
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how much to contribute, how to select investments from a wide ar-
ray of options, and when and whether to increase contributions. 
Thus, the decision to enroll requires consideration of numerous 
complex concepts that many workers may not feel comfortable or 
equipped to make.150 This discomfort causes some individuals to fall 
into the pattern of putting off the decision until they have an oppor-
tunity to acquire more information, which oftentimes never oc-
curs.151 As a result, these individuals miss out on valuable economic 
benefits, including the tax advantages of saving in a qualified re-
tirement plan, the value of compound growth, and, in some cases, 
employer matched funds.152 
Thankfully, these challenges are not insurmountable and can be 
addressed by providing financial education, as discussed above. 
They also can be significantly minimized by reversing the default 
setting of the plan from non-enrollment to enrollment.153 Under such 
a design, immediately after workers become eligible to participate in 
401(k) plans, they are deemed to have elected to defer a predeter-
mined percentage of their compensation to the plan, with predeter-
mined asset allocations.154 Workers who are automatically enrolled 
in this manner are free to “opt out”; however, behavioral finance re-
search indicates that most individuals will not because they are not 
active decision makers.155 The principle of “inertia” explains that 
most individuals will remain with a default option because they will 
fail to take affirmative measures to change.156 Accordingly, when the 
plan has a default setting of saving, workers will not act to change 
the setting and will save; when the plan has a default setting of not 
saving, workers will not act to change the setting and will not save.157 
The auto-enrollment concept has been studied over the last two 
decades and has proven to be very effective in increasing participa-
 
150. See supra subsection III.A.1. 
151. See Tax Reform and Tax-Favored Retirement Accounts: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Ways and Means, 112th Cong. 92 (2012) (statement of David C. John, Senior Research Fellow in 
Retirement Security and Financial Institutions, The Heritage Foundation). 
152. See BENARTZI, supra note 144, at 45–46 (describing the compound effect of retirement 
decisions made early in a worker’s career). 
153. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 430 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-1(a)(3)(ii) (as 
amended in 2009)); see also BENARTZI, supra note 144, at 38–56. 
154. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 430. 
155. Id. (citing Richard Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral 
Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. 164, 164–87 (2004)). 
156. See id. at 10, 38–40 (advising that workers who initially chose to opt out of a plan 
should still be continuously asked when they would like to be enrolled in the future). 
157. See id. at 430. 
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tion rates among eligible employees.158 Some studies have shown in-
creases of up to 20%, from mid-60% levels to mid-80% levels, as a 
result of this approach.159 Automatic enrollment has been especially 
effective in increasing participation rates among populations that 
otherwise tend to have lower savings rates, such as low- and middle-
income workers, women, and younger workers.160 Some studies 
have shown a rate increase of more than 65%, from the mid-teens 
levels to the mid-80% levels for these groups.161 
Although automatic enrollment can significantly increase partici-
pation rates in 401(k) plans, it does not necessarily increase the 
overall savings rates in these plans.162 In fact, some have argued that 
the opt-out design actually lowers overall savings rates because it 
encourages participants to remain at very conservative default posi-
tions for both contribution levels and investment allocations.163 In 
other words, these skeptics explain that those who would have 
elected to save at higher rates in the absence of the opt-out design 
may actually save less by remaining at the lower rates.164 To the ex-
tent that this decrease is not offset by an increase in savings among 
those who would not have elected to save in the absence of the opt-
 
158. See Jack VanDerhei & Craig Copeland, The Impact of PPA on Retirement Savings for 401(k) 
Participants, 318 EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. 1 (2008), available at http://www.ebri.org/ 
pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_06-20087.pdf. 
159. See Tax Reform and Tax-Favored Retirement Accounts: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Ways 
and Means, 112th Cong. 86 (2012) (statement of David C. John, Senior Research Fellow, Herit-
age Foundation). 
160. See id. 
161. See id.; see also Press Release, Fidelity Invs., Fidelity Analysis Highlights Positive Im-
pact of Pension Protection Act on 401(k) Plans and Their Participants (Nov. 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/30/idUS155072+30-Nov-2011+BW20111130 (finding 
that auto enrollment increased the participation rate of workers age twenty to twenty-four from 
only 20% up to about 76%). 
162. See Barbara A. Butrica & Nadia S. Karamcheva, How Does 401(k) Auto-Enrollment Relate 
to the Employer Match and Total Compensation?, 13-14 CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RES. AT B.C. 5 
(2013), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/IB_13-14.pdf; see also LANG-
BEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 430. 
163. See Butrica & Karamcheva, supra note 162, at 5 (“While auto-enrollment will increase 
saving for workers who would not have participated without it, those who would have partic-
ipated on their own may end up saving less due to relatively low employer match rates and 
low default contribution rates.”); see also Larry W. Beeferman & Matthew B. Becker, Going on 
Automatic: The Right Path Toward Retirement Income Security for All? 6 HARV. PENSION & CAPI-
TAL STEWARDSHIP PROJECT OCCASIONAL PAPERS 52 (2010), available at http://www.law.harvard 
.edu/programs/lwp/pensions/publications/occpapers/occasionalpaper6.pdf (“[T]hat very 
inertia which is said to make automatic enrollment effective also operates against increases in 
contributions: because workers are said to be passive, they not only do not act to opt out after 
being automatically enrolled, but also do not act to change their contribution rate.”). 
164. See Beeferman & Becker, supra note 163, at 52. 
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out design, the net result is a wash, or potentially even a decrease in 
overall savings.165 
An automatic escalation feature that provides for gradual increas-
es in employee contributions over time can mitigate this effect. Al-
though participants are free to opt out of such arrangements, they 
tend not to because of the same effect of inertia that prevents them 
from opting out of enrollment.166 Thus, if the default setting is to in-
crease savings rates over time, they will; if the default setting is to re-
main at the same level, they will. Accordingly, the use of automatic 
escalation in conjunction with automatic enrollment can result in both 
increased participation rates and increased overall savings levels.167 
Initially, some commentators expressed concern that such auto-
matic features would not retain sufficient employee choice to qualify 
a plan as a “cash or deferred arrangement.”168 The law, however, 
now expressly authorized automatic plan designs.169 Furthermore, 
the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) created incentives for em-
ployers that sponsor 401(k) plans to implement this approach by 
adding safe harbor auto enrollment and auto escalation provisions.170 
2. The automatic enrollment and escalation proposal 
Because of the proven benefits that automatic features provide, 
this Reflection proposes that all employers offering 401(k) plans as 
primary retirement savings instruments be required to use automat-
ic enrollment and automatic escalation in their plan design. These 
design features have been shown to have significant and positive 
impacts on participation and savings levels, even under the most 
conservative assumptions.171 Thus, mandating the use of automatic 
 
165. See Butrica & Karamcheva, supra note 162, at 4 (“Employers with auto-enrollment may 
be aiming to keep their compensation costs roughly constant. While they end up spending 
more on workers who would not have participated without auto-enrollment, they spend less 
on workers who would have signed up anyway.”). 
166. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
167. BENARTZI, supra note 144, at 118–20 (showing that plans using automatic enrollment 
and automatic escalation of contribution percentages are the most effective in ensuring that 
workers amass adequate retirement savings); see also VanDerhei & Copeland, supra note 158, 
at 5. 
168. LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 430 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-1(a)(3)(ii) (as 
amended in 2009)). 
169. Id. 
170. See VanDerhei & Copeland, supra note 158, at 6–7 (noting that these safe harbors 
preempted any state laws which would have prohibited these automatic plan features). 
171. See id. at 1. 
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plan provisions in certain qualified 401(k) plans would make these 
saving arrangements more effective retirement savings vehicles.172 
The benefits from automatic features are numerous. Default set-
tings for savings rates, asset allocation, and incremental increases 
significantly simplify the retirement savings process, eliminating the 
necessity of workers making complex financial decisions.173 Addi-
tionally, because many participants wait several years before enrol-
ling in 401(k) plans, mandatory automatic design would mean that 
some workers would begin to save much earlier than they otherwise 
would, which positively impacts their retirement security.174 Also, 
mandating automatic provisions increases the likelihood that a cross 
section of workers will actually receive more meaningful levels of 
benefits from the plans that their employers sponsor. 
Opponents may argue the proposed mandate is unduly burden-
some or excessively paternalistic. However, compliance with an au-
tomatic plan design is cost effective and relatively simple. Further-
more, as I argued in the case of mandatory education, requiring em-
ployers to take measures to increase plan participation and make the 
savings process simpler for employees is a way to justify the sub-
stantial tax benefits that employers who sponsor 401(k) plans receive. 
C. Additional Tax Advantage Based on Vested Accrued Benefits of 
Non-Highly Compensated Workers 
As a means of encouraging more meaningful participation of low- 
and middle-income workers in private retirement plans, and also of 
achieving a more equitable distribution of benefits from qualified 
plans in today’s retirement savings culture, this Reflection proposes 
that an additional tax incentive for retirement savings is offered in 
the form of a new employer credit. The proposed credit would be 
provided in conjunction with the tax benefits that qualified plans 
currently receive. 
 
172. See Jon Vogler, Auto Focus: Voluntary Plans Morphing to Mandatory?, ADVISOR PERSPEC-
TIVES (Oct. 7, 2013), http://advisorperspectives.com/commentaries/invesco_100413.php (not-
ing that automatic provisions are supported by the Obama administration and many mem-
bers of the investment company industry).  
173. See GENE AMROMIN ET AL., FINANCIAL LITERACY AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FINANCIAL 
EDUCATION AND COUNSELING: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 2 (2010), http://www.chicagofed.org/ 
digital_assets/others/region/foreclosure_resource_center/more_financial_literacy.pdf (discuss-
ing the problem of financial illiteracy and considering the effectiveness of financial education 
programs). 
174. See BENARTZI, supra note 144, at 5. 
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1. Current tax advantages of qualified plans 
Under current law, the preferential tax treatment of qualified 
plans provides three main advantages. First, the employee, or the 
beneficiary of the employee, is not subject to taxation until contribu-
tions are actually distributed.175 Second, the employer receives an in-
come tax deduction for amounts contributed to the plan at the time 
they are made.176 This advantage is an exception to the general rule 
that an employer is not permitted to take a tax deduction for salary-
related expenditures as an ordinary and necessary business expense 
before the employee includes the payments in income.177 Third, the 
investment earnings on the contributions held by the plan are ex-
empt from taxation.178 
Although the tax advantages afforded by qualified plans are not 
limited to a specific sector of the population with respect to income, 
wealth, or other qualifiers, the domination of 401(k) plans in the pri-
vate retirement system disproportionately benefits high-income 
workers.179 This result occurs, as discussed earlier, because highly 
compensated workers are (1) more likely to participate in 401(k) 
plans than non-highly compensated workers, (2) more likely to con-
tribute greater percentages of their earnings than non-highly com-
pensated workers, and (3) less likely to forfeit their benefits than 
non-highly compensated workers.180 Furthermore, because the pro-
gressive tax rate structure of the federal income tax makes deduc-
tions and tax deferral more valuable to high-income workers, em-
ployers with greater numbers of high-income workers are more like-
ly to offer plans than employers with greater numbers of lower-
wage workers. Thus, the employer deductions taken in connection 
with 401(k) plans overwhelmingly reflect the retirement benefits ul-
timately received by highly compensated workers. 
Presently, the employers’ deductions for contributions made to 
qualified plans are determined without regard to whether or not the 
retirement benefits are vested.181 As a result, employers receive the 
 
175. See I.R.C. § 402(a) (2012). If the distribution is rolled over into an IRA or other quali-
fied plan, however, taxation may be further deferred. I.R.C. § 402(c). Generally, rollovers must 
be made within sixty days. I.R.C. § 402(c)(3)(A). 
176. See I.R.C. § 404(a); see also Jefferson, Redistribution, supra note 11, at 297. 
177. See I.R.C. § 83(h). 
178. See I.R.C. § 501(a). 
179. See Jefferson, Redistribution, supra note 11, at 294. 
180. See EBRI DATABOOK, supra note 71 and accompanying text; see also VANGUARD, supra 
note 89 and accompanying text. 
181. See supra Section I.C. 
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same favorable tax treatment for non-vested contributions as they 
do for vested ones, although employees may forfeit their non-vested 
accruals if they terminate employment prior to becoming vested. As 
discussed earlier, this outcome is more likely to occur in the case of 
lower-income workers, who are more likely to leave before becom-
ing fully vested.182 
To address this situation, measures should be taken to design tax 
incentives that both encourage greater participation among low- 
and middle-income workers, and also distinguish between vested 
and non-vested benefits as a method of achieving a more even dis-
tribution of benefits from the private retirement system. The re-
mainder of this Reflection summarizes the basic structure and ele-
ments of a proposed employer credit designed to accomplish these 
objectives. 
2. Basic elements of proposed credit 
The proposed incentive is offered in the form of a tax credit rather 
than a tax deduction. Although both a tax deduction and a tax credit 
can effectively reduce the employer’s income tax liability, their re-
sults have very different impacts. Tax deductions reduce taxable in-
come; therefore, the value of a deduction is linked to a taxpayer’s 
marginal tax bracket.183 Accordingly, the deductions taken for con-
tributions to qualified plans are more valuable to employers in 
higher tax brackets than they are to ones in lower brackets.184 In con-
trast, because tax credits directly reduce a taxpayer’s tax liability, 
they will have the same nominal value for all employers, regardless 
of the tax brackets.185 As a result, the credit is effective in providing 
more even and widespread incentives for socially desirable behavior.186 
The purpose of the proposed incentive is to encourage a wide 
range of employers who sponsor 401(k) plans to increase participa-
 
182. See supra Section I.C. 
183. See Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS 
L.J. 343, 352–54 (1989) (referring to tax deductions that favor high-income tax payers as “upside-
down” tax subsidies). 
184. See id. 
185. See, e.g., Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, Policy Basics: Tax Exemptions, Deductions, and 
Credits 2 (2013), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/policybasics-exempt.pdf. This is true 
as long as the employer’s tax liability is at least equal to the credit. 
186. See Lily L. Batchelder et al., Policy Brief No. 156: Reforming Tax Incentives into Uniform Re-
fundable Tax Credits, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 6 (2006), available at http://www.brookings 
.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2006/8/taxes%20orszag/pb156.pdf (explaining how tax 
credits can be used to encourage more workers to save for retirement). 
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tion and benefit distributions among low- and middle-income 
workers. Thus, a tax credit is the more appropriate mechanism to 
achieve this objective.187 
The proposed credit would be available to employers who cov-
ered 100% of workers with compensation below a specified amount. 
For administrative ease, the income limit for the proposed credit 
could be set at levels consistent with those of existing retirement 
programs.188 For example, the single-filer income limits for the de-
ductions of contributions to traditional IRAs could be used for this 
purpose. Accordingly, the credit would be based on workers with 
compensation of $70,000 or less.189 
The employer credit for each worker would be calculated as a 
fixed percentage of the employee’s vested accrued benefit, deter-
mined by total employer contributions made in a given year on be-
half of employees with compensation under the specified amount. 
Thus, for example, if an employee with income below the specified 
dollar limit were 60% vested, and the employer’s contributions in a 
given year on her behalf totaled $10,000, the employer credit would 
be based on a contribution of $6000 (i.e. 60% of $10,000). 
For purposes of calculating the credit, all employer contributions 
would be considered, including non-elective and matching contribu-
tions. Employee contributions, however, would not be considered in 
the calculation of the credit. Accordingly, in the example above, if 
the applicable percentage rate for the credit were 50%, the employ-
er’s credit on behalf of that particular worker would equal $3000 (i.e. 
50% of $6000). 
As a method of targeting lower-income workers and also limiting 
lost revenue, the proposed employer credit would phase out as 
workers’ incomes increased. Therefore, the largest credits would be 
given for workers with the lowest incomes, and the smallest credits 
would be given for workers with the highest incomes. To illustrate, 
if the single-filer, phase out limits for deductions to traditional IRAs 
were used, the maximum employer credit would be given for work-
ers with compensation of $60,000 or less.190 The credits for workers 
 
187. See Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, supra note 185. 
188. Obviously, the limits could be determined on other bases as well. 
189. See 2014 IRA Contribution and Deduction Limits, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/ 
Retirement-Plans/Plan-Participant,-Employee/2014--IRA-Contribution-and-Deduction-Limits 
---Effect-of-Modified-AGI-on-Deductible-Contributions-If-You-ARE-Covered-by-a-Retirement 
-Plan-at-Work (last updated Feb. 19, 2014). 
190. See id. (allowing only a partial deduction for IRA contributions when income is great-
er than $60,000 but less than $70,000). 
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with compensation of more than $60,000 would begin to phase out. 
Once the compensation of a worker reached $70,000, the credit 
would be completely phased out. Thus, in the above example, if the 
employee had compensation of $60,000, the employer would receive 
the full credit of $3000. If the employee had compensation of 
$65,000, the employer would receive a credit of $1500. If the em-
ployee had compensation of $70,000, the employer would receive no 
credit at all in connection with that employee. The phase out would 
be indexed for inflation, so that the phase out ranges would remain 
fixed in real terms.191 
The specific numbers and ranges used above are offered for illus-
trative purposes only. The use of revenue and cost estimates could 
result in the selection of different income limits and phase outs. The 
essence of the proposal is not the selected numbers, but rather the 
concept of an employer credit based on the vested accrued benefits 
of low- and middle-income workers. 
The proposed employer credit would appear to advance pension 
policy by increasing retirement security among low- and middle-
income workers, and also fiscal policy by tailoring the tax subsidy to 
benefits actually received by the targeted population. Furthermore, 
the structure of this proposal appears to be politically viable in the 
current retirement savings environment because it motivates em-
ployers to voluntarily broaden coverage among low- and middle-
income workers, rather than mandating it. 
CONCLUSION 
The shift from the use of defined benefit plans to 401(k) plans as 
primary retirement savings instruments occurring since the passage 
of ERISA has not improved participation rates in the private retire-
ment system. In fact, because of the structure of these plans, there is 
greater variance among taxpayers in different income groups regard-
ing plan participation and benefit distribution than ever before. Addi-
tionally, the heavy use of 401(k) plans has challenged traditional 
views regarding the allocation of risk associated with retirement sav-
ings because 401(k) plans make it necessary for workers, rather than 
employers, to make critical financial and investment decisions at eve-
ry stage of the retirement savings process. Thus, the trend of using 
 
191. See, Jim Chen, The Price of Macroeconomic Imprecision: How Should the Law Measure Infla-
tion?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1375, 1406–07 (2003) (noting that many provisions in the federal tax 
code are indexed to account for inflation). 
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401(k) plans as primary retirement vehicles has significantly changed 
the retirement savings culture and has created a need to develop new 
and different ways of increasing participation and contribution levels 
in 401(k) plans, particularly among low- and middle-income workers. 
Requiring employers that sponsor 401(k) plans to provide invest-
ment education programs, and to use automatic plan designs, re-
sponds to these challenges without unduly burdening employers. 
Research shows that the use of both approaches—financial educa-
tion and automatic plan design—positively impacts the participa-
tion and savings rates among all workers. Accordingly, these pro-
posals address numerous concerns regarding the effectiveness of the 
use of 401(k) plans as primary retirement savings vehicles in the 
private pension system. 
The proposed employer credit specifically targets the problem of 
low participation and contribution levels in 401(k) plans among low- 
and middle-income workers. The proposed credit advances pension 
policy in numerous ways. First, it is cost efficient, as the tax subsidy is 
linked to the benefits of low- and middle-income workers only—
presumably the workers who are unable to save on their own. Sec-
ond, the proposed credit is more effective, as it measures the eligible 
contributions on the bases of vested accrued benefits that are more 
likely to be received as retirement benefits by the targeted population 
than are non-vested benefits. Third, the proposed credit encourages 
broader participation and benefit distribution in 401(k) plans, which 
increases the overall fairness of the private retirement system. Addi-
tional incentives, such as these three proposals, will not provide re-
tirement security for all workers, but will go a long way in ensuring 
that more workers actually benefit from their employer-sponsored 
plans. 
